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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shawn Kesling appeals following the district court's order correcting judgment 
pursuant to l.C.R. 35(a) and the district court's order denying his motion for credit for 
time served. Mr. Kesling asserts that the district court erred in revoking his probation in 
39486 as the probationary term had expired. Mr. Kesling also asserts that the district 
court erred when it denied his motion requesting credit for time served on his Idaho 
state sentence, as he was held pursuant to a detainer warrant twenty days before he 
had finished serving his Florida sentence. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39484 (district court case number 2003-557 
(hereinafter, 39484)), Supreme Court Docket No. 39485 (district court case number 
2003-589 (hereinafter, 39485)), and Supreme Court Docket No. 39486 (district court 
case number 2003-379 (hereinafter, 39486)) have been consolidated for appellate 
purposes. (R., pp.2-3.) 
In 2003, in docket number 39484, Mr. Kesling was convicted of one count of 
felony forgery. (R., pp.61-65.) In docket number 39485, Mr. Kesling was convicted of 
one count of grand theft by deception. (R., pp.228-232.) In docket number 39486, 
Mr. Kesling was convicted of one count of felony issuing a check without funds. (R., 
pp.418-422.) In docket number 39484, the district court imposed a unified sentence of 
nine years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.61-65.) In docket number 39485, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.228-232.) 
In docket number 39486, the district court also imposed a unified sentence of nine 
years, with two years fixed, and all three sentences were to run concurrent with each 
1 
other. (R., pp.418-422.) The court placed Mr. Kesling on probation for nine years in all 
three cases. (R., pp.61-65, 228-232, 418-422.) 
Mr. Kesling's probation was transferred to Florida. (39484, 39485, 39486 
State v. Kesling PSl.pdf (hereinafter, PSI), pp.4, 16.) Although a motion for probation 
violation was filed on December 9, 2004, because Mr. Kesling had not paid the entirety 
of his restitution, the parties stipulated to extend the time and means by which 
Mr. Kesling would pay his restitution and the warrant was quashed on December 22, 
2004. (R., pp.75-82, 236-243, 425-432.) On January 3, 2005, the district court 
amended the judgment of conviction and order of probation. 1 (R., pp.85, 246, 435.) On 
October 31, 2005, Mr. Kesling's probation was modified to allow him to have a bank 
account, credit card, etc., and to allow him to manage his own finances. 2 (R., pp.86, 
247, 442.) 
On March 4, 2008, Mr. Kesling was sentenced to a forty-five (45) month term of 
incarceration in the Florida Department of Correction in a Florida state case. (PSI., 
pp.5-6.) That same day, Mr. Kesling's file was marked "NOTIFY 080, PROB TO [] 
FOLLOW DC/ 07-4206-CFA."3 (PSI., p.130.) In all three cases a Motion for Bench 
Warrant for Probation Violation based solely on the new Florida convictions was filed on 
March 26, 2008, and an Order for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed on 
1 The parties stipulated to amend a paragraph of the Judgment of Conviction and Order 
of Probation to read that all fines, costs, fees, and restitution owed to be paid in full after 
Mr. Kesling settled his pending personal injury claim. (R., pp.83-85, 244-246, 433-435.) 
2 Mr. Kesling's probationary terms dictated that he not have a bank account, credit card, 
and shall not make any purchases on credit without prior approval by the probation 
officer, and shall allow his spouse to manage their finances. (R.,pp.64, 231, 421.) 
3 It appears that on March 4, 2008, Idaho Probation & Parole asked to be notified before 
Mr. Kesling was to be discharged. This interpretation is borne out in the description 
preceding the notations, "the following reflects detainers against this record, and/or 
requests to be notified prior to release of the inmate." (PSI, p.130.) However, neither 
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March 27, 2008. (R., pp.90-94, 251-255, 447-452.) A Bench Warrant was issued on 
March 28, 2008, but not served until March 29, 2011; it was filed on March 30, 2011. 
(R., pp.95-96, 256-257, 452-453.) 
Before he had finished serving his Florida sentence, on March 2, 2011, the 
"notify" from Idaho was changed to a "detain" designation. (PSI, p.130.) Presumably 
this meant that a detainer warrant had been placed on Mr. Kesling. (See PSI, p.130.) 
After he finished serving his sentence on the Florida case on March 22, 2011, 
Mr. Kesling was held without bail or bond to be transported back to Idaho. (PSI, 
pp.130-131.) When he finally arrived in Idaho approximately seven days later, 
Mr. Kesling was served with the bench warrant for the probation violations in each of his 
three Idaho cases. (R., pp.95-96, 256-257, 452-453; 12/8/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-5.) 
Mr. Kesling admitted that he violated his probation by incurring new charges. (R., 
pp.125-126.) 
Counsel for Mr. Kesling then filed a Motion for Additional Credit Time Served. 
(R., pp.132, 298, 491.) In the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Credit for Time 
Served, relying upon Idaho Code sections 18-309 and 19-2603, and the Court of 
Appeals' decision in State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169 (Ct. App. 2006), Mr. Kesling sought 
1121 days of credit for the time he served from March 2008, when the detainer warrant 
was lodged until the date the Bench Warrant was officially served, on March 29, 2011.4 
(R., pp.132-141, 298-307, 491-500.) In the supporting memorandum, counsel relied 
upon State v. Covert for the proposition that other types of warrants can serve as the 
the record on appeal nor the register of actions contains information as to what 
documents, if any, were sent to notify Florida of the Idaho cases. 
4 Mr. Kesling has since learned that the 2008 hold that had been described as a 
"detainer" was actually a request by Idaho Probation and Parole for Florida authorities 
to "notify" them when he was released from custody in Florida. (PSI, p.130.) 
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"functional equivalent of a bench warrant" such that a probationer can receive credit on 
his sentence after an agent's warrant has been served. (R., pp.137-138, 303-304, 496-
497.) 
After the district court heard arguments on Mr. Kesling's motion for credit for time 
served, it revoked his probation. 8/18/11 Tr., p.5, L.10 - p.7, L.2; 12/8/11 Tr., p.26, L.6 
- p.28, L6.) The district court revoked Mr. Kesling's probation and credited him with 479 
days in 39484, 494 days in 39485, and 479 days in 39486.5 . (R., pp.151-152, 317-318, 
510-511.) On December 14, 2011, Mr. Kesling filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
district court's order. (R., pp.154-156, 320-322, 513-515.) On December 19, 2011, 
Mr. Kesling's counsel filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.157-159, 323-325, 516-
518.) A prose Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on January 20, 2012. (R., pp.161-
165, 327-331, 520-524.) 
On January 8, 2013, in 39486, Mr. Kesling filed a pro se Motion to Correct 
Judgment under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c), with accompanying documents, including 
the transcript of the probation violation disposition hearing before Judge Williamson on 
December 8, 2011. (Motion to Correct Judgment, attached to Motion to Augment filed 
April 2, 2013.) The State did not oppose Mr. Kesling's motion, and the district court 
granted the Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, finding that in 39484, the amount 
of credit for time served was initially miscalculated and Mr. Kesling received only 479 
days of credit for time served. (Order on Amended Motion for Credit For Time Served, 
attached to Motion to Augment filed April 2, 2013.) The court found that on 
December 31, 2012, it had granted Mr. Kesling 494 days of credit for time served on 
5 At his disposition, the district court advised Mr. Kesling that he would receive 
additional credit in the case he bonded out on, because he was sitting in custody on the 
two other cases. (12/8/11 Tr., p.24, L.6 - p.26, L.20.) 
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39484 and, therefore, granted Mr. Kesling's motion in 39486, crediting Mr. Kesling with 
494 days served. (Order on Amended Motion for Credit For Time Served, attached to 
Motion to Augment filed April 2, 2013.) 
Mr. Kesling then filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence [1.C.R. 35(a)] on 
February 21, 2012. (R., pp.529-531.) Mr. Kesling contended that his unified sentence 
of nine years, for the offense of Issuing a Check Without Funds in violation of l.C. S 18-
3106(A) was illegal as a matter of law in that the maximum penalty for a violation of this 
statute is three years. (R., p.530.) On March 16, 2012, the district court issued an 
order correcting the judgment. (R., pp.544-545.) In its order, the district court revoked 
the probation in 39486 entered on November 25, 2003, and re-sentenced Mr. Kesling to 
serve a unified sentence of three years, with two years fixed, concurrent with the 
sentences in 39484 and 39485. (R., pp.544-545.) 
Mr. Kesling contends that the time after the detainer warrant was placed should 
be credited to his Idaho probation violation sentence. Mr. Kesling was held in Florida6 
on the Idaho charges, beginning on March 2, 2011, and the Idaho bench warrant was 
not served until March 29, 2011. 
Mr. Kesling contends on appeal that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
revoke his probation in 39486, and it abused its discretion by denying his motion for 
credit for time served in his cases. 
6 At some point Mr. Kesling was in the process of being transported to Idaho during the 
latter part of these dates. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Kesling's probation in 39486? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kesling's motion for credit for time 
served? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke Mr. Kesling's 
Probation In 39486 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Kesling contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
when it revoked his probation in case 39486 because the violation that constituted the 
basis for the district court's decision occurred after the court's jurisdiction had expired. 
Mr. Kesling's probation should have been over on November 25, 2006; the acts that 
constituted the sole basis for the probation violations occurred in March of 
2007. Therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Kesling's 
probation based upon events that occurred after the statutorily mandated term of 
probation in 39486 had ended. 
B. Standard of Review 
While personal jurisdiction may be waived, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
waived and "may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004). "Issues about the district court's jurisdiction are 
issues of law, over which [Idaho appellate courts] exercise independent review." Id. 
C. The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke Mr. Kesling's Probation 
in 39486 
"[U]nder a conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be 
for a period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have 
been imprisoned." l.C. § 19-2601 (7).7 The offense of issuing a check without sufficient 
7 The relevant portion of Idaho Code §19-2601 (7) provides: 
7 
funds carries a maximum penalty of three years in the state penitentiary. l.C. § 18-
3106(a).8 Thus, the nine-year period of probationary term in 39486 exceeded the 
maximum allowed by statute. 
On March 16, 2012, the district court issued an Order Revoking Probation, 
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment, and Order Correcting Judgment, 
which corrected the error made in 39486 in 2003, when the district court sentenced 
ML Kesling. (Order Correcting Judgment Pursuant, attached to Motion to Augment filed 
on April 2, 2013.) The Order Correcting Judgment reduced Mr. Kesling's sentence in 
39486 to three years, the maximum allowable by statute. (See l.C. § 18-3106(a); Order 
Correcting Judgment, attached to Motion to Augment filed on April 2, 2013.) Consistent 
with that correction, the longest period of time that Mr. Kesling could have been on 
probation in 39486 was three years. See l.C. § 19-2601. Mr. Kesling was originally 
The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under . . . a 
conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a 
period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant 
might have been imprisoned. 
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (7). 
8 The offense of issuing a check without funds provides: 
Any person who for himself or as the agent or representative of another or 
as an officer of a corporation, willfully, with intent to defraud shall make or 
draw or utter or deliver, or cause to be made, drawn, uttered or delivered, 
any check, draft or order for the payment of money upon any bank or 
depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation, knowing at the time of such 
making, drawing, uttering or delivery that the maker or drawer has no 
funds in or credit with such bank or depositary, or person, or firm, or 
corporation, for the payment in full of such check, draft or order upon its 
presentation, although no express representation is made with reference 
thereto, shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for a term not to exceed three (3) years or by a fine not to exceed 
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Idaho Code§ 18-3106(a). 
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placed on probation on November 25, 2003. (R., p.412-424.) Therefore, Mr. Kesling's 
probation in 39486 would have ended in November of 2006. 9 
Mr. Kesling contends that although the district court correctly recognized in 2012 
that his sentence in 39486 exceeded the maximum allowable by statute, it failed to 
correct its error and find that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to revoke 
Mr. Kesling's probation in 2011. See l.C. § 20-222; l.C. § 19-2602; see also State v. 
Gamino, 148 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that probation revocation proceedings 
must be initiated during the period of probation). As such, the district court lost 
jurisdiction over Mr. Kesling in case number 39486 in November of 2006 and, therefore, 
it did not have the authority to revoke his probation in 2011. This Court should dismiss 
39486. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kesling's Motion For Credit For Time 
Served 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Kesling asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for 
credit for time served. First, as Mr. Kesling was being held on a detainer warrant to 
later be transported back to Idaho to answer for his probation violation allegations, he 
was not released by Florida authorities after he had completed his sentence. Second, 
in light of the fact that this information 10 prohibited Mr. Kesling from being released, 
9 Although a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed on December 9, 
2004, pursuant to the parties' stipulation the order for a bench warrant was 
subsequently quashed by the district court on December 22, 2004 and the petition 
withdrawn. (R., pp.425-432.) 
10 The record on appeal does not indicate (or include) the specific document(s) received 
by Florida from Idaho which apparently asked Florida officials to "notify" Idaho officials 
when Mr. Kesling was due to be released, nor does the record contain the document(s) 
which served to "detain" Mr. Kesling on the three Ada County cases after his release on 
9 
such constitutes a warrant per se, and he should receive credit for all time after the 
placement of the detainer warrant on March 2, 2011. For the reasons set forth herein, 
he respectfully requests that this Court order that he be given credit for time served in 
the amount of twenty days. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A determination as to "[w]hether the district court· properly applied the law 
governing credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, 
the appellate court will "defer to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless 
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record 
and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kesling' Request For Credit For 
Time Served 
A sentence is imposed when it is initially pronounced. Mickelsen v. Idaho State 
Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 355 (Ct. App. 1998). Idaho Code Section 18-309 governs 
when credit must be given for both pre- and post-judgment incarceration: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period 
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the 
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The 
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence 
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is 
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned 
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as 
part of such term. 
the Florida charges. (See PSI, p.130.) Mr. Kesling reserves the right to supplement the 
record with this information in his post-conviction case. 
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The language of l.C. § 18-309 entitles a defendant to credit for "any period of 
incarceration" and notably does not base credit on any factor other than actual 
incarceration. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he directive of l.C. § 18-309 is 
mandatory, specifying that a person shall receive credit." State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 
850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in 
original). Although the first sentence of l.C. § 18-309 deals solely with pre-judgment 
incarceration, the second sentence of l.C. § 18-309 addresses post-judgment 
incarceration and awards credit for time served for any time served after the sentence is 
commenced. 
According to the second sentence of I. C. § 18-309, "the remainder of the term [of 
imprisonment] commences upon the pronouncement of sentence .... " I. C. § 18-309. 
The Court of Appeals has recognized that this sentence "impl[ies] that all time spent in 
custody after sentencing is credited to the defendant's sentence." State v. Albertson, 
135 Idaho 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2001 ). That court found that this second sentence 
requires "credit against a sentence for any time spent in custody after the entry of 
judgment, except periods of county jail incarceration that were served as a condition of 
probation." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically found that an "order revoking 
probation is not a judgment." Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594. 
Further, l.C. § 20-209A addresses credit for time served both before and after 
judgment. That section states: 
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his 
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is 
sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for time 
spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that 
11 
detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was 
imposed. The time during which the person is voluntarily absent from the 
penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the board of correction, or 
from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or 
counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced. 
l.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added). 
Thus section 20-209A recognizes that credit for any time in physical custody may 
be awarded when the detention is merely "in connection with the offense .... " 
l.C. § 20-209A. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that l.C. § 18-309, "does not directly 
address the question of credit for time served after an entry of judgment for defendants, 
who ... have been placed on probation but ultimately have had their probation revoked." 
State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280 (1998). Rather, l..C. § 19-2603 specifically 
addresses credit for time served when a previously suspended sentence is executed, or 
when a person has served a period of incarceration for probation violations during a 
period of withheld judgment. See l.C. § 19-2603; State v. Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 
922 P.2d at 424-25 (granting credit for time served pursuant to l.C. § 19-2603 for pre-
judgment time involuntarily served during a period of withheld judgment after service of 
the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant). In relevant part, l.C. § 19-2603 states, 
"the time such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence shall 
not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's 
sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench warrant."11 Id. (emphasis 
added). 
11 The language "of such bench warrant" appears to reference a bench warrant issued 
pursuant to section 19-2602, which authorizes a court to issue a bench warrant if it is 
proven to the court's satisfaction that the terms and conditions of probation have been 
violated. See l.C. § 19-2602. 
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When l.C. § 18-309, § 19-2603, and § 20-209A are read together it is apparent 
that credit for time served is awarded as follows: 
Post-judgment incarceration is awarded for any actual incarceration which 
occurs after the judgment (§ 18-309), so long as the incarceration is in 
connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed (§ 20-
209A), including when the time is served after service of a bench warrant 
for a probation violation (§ 19-2603). 
1. Mr. Kesling's Probation Violation Allegations Were Based Upon Precisely 
The Same Acts That Gave Rise To His Florida Charges 
Mr. Kesling should have been entitled to credit for the period of time in which he 
was incarcerated in Florida following the placement of the detention warrant by Florida 
at the request of Idaho for the probation violations, as the probation violation allegation 
was filed as a result of the offenses for which he was serving the 45 month sentence in 
Florida. See l.C. § 18-309; § 19-2603; § 20-209A. 
Credit for pre-judgment incarceration is awarded only if "such incarceration was 
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered." l.C. § 18-
309. This "means that the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment 
incarceration is a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the 
sentence is imposed." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) (citation 
omitted). "Thus, there must be a causal effect between the offense and the 
incarceration in order for the incarceration to be 'for' the offense, as the term is used in 
l.C. § 18-309." Id.; see a/so State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. (1994) (addressing 
a request for prejudgment credit for time served and denying credit because the 
prejudgment incarceration was not caused by or attributable to the charge for which the 
sentence was imposed); State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763 (1989) (addressing a request for 
13 
prejudgment credit for time served and denying credit because the prejudgment 
incarceration was not attributable to the charge for which the sentence was imposed). 
The charges for which Mr. Kesling was serving prison time in Florida formed the 
basis for his Idaho probation violation charges. (R., pp.90-94, 251-255, 447-452.) 
Further, due to the detainer warrant, Mr. Kesling was not free to leave after he 
successfully served his time in Florida, but was held and then transported to Idaho. The 
district court erred in denying Mr. Kesling's motion for credit time served, and he should 
be credited with an additional twenty days on each of his Idaho cases. 
This position is supported by Idaho case law. The facts of State v. McCarthy, 
145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008), are on point with the facts of Mr. Kesling's case. In 
McCarthy, the defendant incurred new charges while on probation in another case. Id., 
145 Idaho at 398. The State filed a motion for probation violation, based on the new 
charges. Id. The defendant was arrested on a bench warrant for the probation 
violations and a month later was arrested on an arrest warrant for the new charges. Id. 
The district court denied the defendant's motion for credit on the probation violation 
case from the time the warrant was served until the entry of judgment. Id. The Court of 
Appeals in McCarthy found that "[w]hen it is the same acts that give rise to both 
warrants for the defendant's arrest and the confinement is served simultaneously, it 
cannot be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to either case individually." 
McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 399. The Court of Appeals held that.the defendant was entitled 
to credit on his probation violation sentence and remanded the case back to the district 
court for entry of an order granting the defendant credit for the time he was in custody 
on the probation violation. Id. 
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Mr. Kesling asserts that, because the facts in the record show that he is entitled 
to twenty days of credit for time served, the district court erred when it denied his 
request for credit for time served. 
2. The Detainer Warrant Serves As The Functional Equivalent Of A Bench 
Warrant 
The term "detainer" is not defined in the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers. However, in Bronkema, the Idaho Court of Appeals, citing the United States 
Supreme Court, defined the term "detainer," as used in l.C. § 19-5001, as: 
Entail[ing] some form of written communication initiated by 
the receiving state which is filed or lodged with the custodial or 
sending state requesting the sending state to notify the receiving 
state of the prisoner's imminent release from custody, or to hold the 
prisoner after his release for the receiving state. 
State v. Bronkema, 109 Idaho 211, 214 (Ct. App. 1985) (parentheticals and emphasis 
omitted) (citing Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S 716 (1985); United States v. Mauro, 436 
U.S. 340 (1978)). 
In Carchman v. Nash, the United States Supreme Court noted that the drafters of 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act defined a detainer as "a warrant filed against 
a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that he will be available to the 
authority which has placed the detainer." 473 U.S. at 727, citing and quoting COUNCIL 
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, PROGRAM FOR 
1957, at 74 (1956) (emphasis added). Although the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
Act does not apply to instances involving a probation violation, the definition adopted by 
the drafters of the Agreement is instructive in defining a detainer is a type of warrant. 
See State v. Swain, 122 Idaho 918, 920 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act does not apply to warrants or detainers for claims of 
alleged probation violations). 
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Idaho Code § 19-2603 mandates that when a defendant has been arrested on a 
bench warrant for a probation violation and the probation is subsequently revoked, "the 
time of the defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench 
warrant." See also State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Lively, 
131 Idaho 279, 280 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 127-28 (Ct. App. 
1996). When a defendant serves jail time as a condition of probation, however, the 
defendant is not entitled to the credit for that time served. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 8 
(2002); State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 609-610 (1992). 
Idaho Code § 19-2603, clearly states that credit shall accrue after the service of a 
bench warrant. However, although LC.§ 19-2603, only provides for credit after a bench 
warrant has been served, Idaho appellate courts have found that the "functional 
equivalent" of a bench warrant will also suffice to begin calculating the amount of credit 
a defendant is entitled to. See Buys, 129 Idaho at 128; see also Coverl, 143 Idaho at 
170-171. 
In State v. Buys, the Idaho Court of Appeals granted the defendant's motion for 
credit for time served pursuant to LC. § 19-2603 for pre-judgment time involuntarily 
served during a period of withheld judgment. 129 Idaho at 127-28. The Court of 
Appeals noted that l.C. § 19-2603 provided that where a defendant has been arrested 
and his probation revoked due to the violation, the defendant's incarceration from the 
time the bench warrant was served will count as part of the sentence. Id., 129 Idaho at 
127. However, the Court concluded that the district court erred in not allowing credit for 
"discretionary time" the defendant served pursuant to an order of incarceration, as 
defendant's liberty was affected and there was no term or condition of probation 
allowing for discretionary jail time. Id. The Court found that the order, which appeared 
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to have been drafted by and issued at the request of the defendant's probation officer, 
appeared to be the functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued as a consequence 
of an alleged violation of the terms of probation. Id., 129 Idaho at 128. Notably, the 
Court found that the order affected the defendant's liberty, because, even though he 
was also arrested for the new offense, he would have been eligible for release on bond 
in the new case but for the order requiring his incarceration for a period of time for the 
probation violation allegation. Id. The Court therefore concluded that the order for 
incarceration was in substance and effect a bench warrant for the defendant's arrest in 
connection with an alleged probation violation, and he was entitled to credit for time 
served under I. C. § 19-2603. Id. 
State v. Covert involved similar factual circumstances. 143 Idaho 169. In Covert, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals found that an agent's warrant was the functional equivalent 
of a bench warrant under § 19-2603, and the defendant was entitled to credit for the 
time he had served as he would have been eligible for release on bond if not for the 
agent's warrant. Id., 143 Idaho at 170-71. 
Here, like the facts in Covert, the detainer warrant was the functional equivalent 
of a bench warrant, as Mr. Kesling's freedom was affected. Mr. Kesling is entitled to 
twenty additional days of credit for time served on his Idaho cases. 
The register of actions does not indicate what document or documents were sent 
to Florida that served as a warrant of detainer; however, similar to the facts of State v. 
Rogers, a copy of the unserved bench warrant that was issued back in March of 2008 
could have been used to detain Mr. Kesling. See State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223 
(2004) (finding that the district court did not intend to relinquish jurisdiction and it had 
asked the prosecutor to get a bench warrant lodged as a detainer). 
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This is supported by common sense and public policy reasons. Once a 
defendant has been detained, or his freedom restricted in such a way that he is not free 
to leave his place of incarceration once he has finished serving his sentence, the means 
by which he is detained should not be limited to a strict reading of the statute. Where, 
as here, a bench warrant was issued, but not served for three years until the defendant 
was returned to Idaho, it is axiomatic to vest the bench warrant with any real import. 
Thus the physical service of a bench warrant, when a defendant can be held for a 
substantial amount of time using documentation that restrains the defendant's way in 
precisely the same means as a bench warrant, should not be determinative of whether 
the defendant's sentence is credited. 12 
The record establishes that a "notify" was placed on Mr. Kesling on March 4, 
2008. (PSI, p.130.) A "detain" was placed on Mr. Kesling on March 2, 2011, from Ada 
County, Idaho relating to probation violation allegations in his three Ada County cases. 
(PSI, p.130.) There is no evidence that Mr. Kesling was ever released from the Idaho 
detainer warrant and, in fact, the district court acknowledged that Mr. Kesling had been 
eligible for release for a number of days before the bench warrant was actually served 
on him: 
I'm willing, though, because it appears that you were eligible to be 
released from Florida earlier than when the bench warrant was actually 
served on you. So I believe you were actually being held on a bench 
warrant at that point, even though officially it hadn't been served on you. 
(12/8/11 Tr., p.27, Ls.12-18.) The district court credited Mr. Kesling with the seven days 
from the completion of his Florida sentence to the time he arrived in Idaho and was 
12 The district court also noted that "fairness dictates that from the time that [Mr. Kesling] 
w[as] eligible for release from Florida that [he's] entitled to additional credit." (12/8/11 
Tr., p.29, Ls.2-4.) 
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served with the bench warrant. 13 (12/8/11 Tr., p.28.) The district court otherwise denied 
Mr. Kesling's motion for credit for time served. (See 12/8/11 Tr.) 
Mr. Kesling was continuously incarcerated in Florida until March 22, 2011, when 
he was transported to Idaho. (PSI, p.130-131.) Mr. Kesling was not served with the 
bench warrant that was issued on March 4, 2008 until he arrived in Idaho on March 29, 
2011. (12/8/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-5.) This resulted in a period of incarceration totaling 27 
days for which Mr. Kesling should have received credit in his Idaho cases. (R., pp.95-
96, 256-257, 452-453.) While the district court properly recognized that Mr. Kesling was 
entitled to an additional seven days, it denied Mr. Kesling's request for additional 
credit. 14 (12/8/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-5, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.2.) 
This Court should hold that Mr. Kesling is entitled to c"redit of twenty days for the 
period of incarceration in Florida during which an Idaho detainer warrant had been 
placed on him which constrained his freedom upon completion of his Florida 
sentence. Mr. Kesling should be credited with the additional twenty days served in 
custody as the Florida cases gave rise to the probation violation allegations in the Idaho 
cases. 
13 The district court credited Mr. Kesling's cases with the additional seven days as 
~ranting a Rule 35 request for leniency. (12/8/11 Tr., p.28, L.7 - p.29, L.5.) 
4 Mr. Kesling originally asked for 1335 days of credit, dating back to the date on which 
the "inquiry" was placed on his status, believing in good faith that this was a detainer 
warrant. However, it has since come to Mr. Kesling's attention that perhaps he was not 
"detained" until March 2, 2011. (See PSI, pp.124, 130.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Kesling respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss case number 39486 and order that he be given additional credit for time served 
in the amount of twenty days in his cases. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2013. 
SALL Y'1:'.:coisttY ,~ 
Deputy State Appellate?Public Defender 
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